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Abstract 
 
This paper analyzes the relationship between manager tenure and performance in corporate bond 
mutual funds, using a sample from Morningstar of 665 funds from 2002-2017. Based on a 
univariate portfolio analysis and panel regressions, the results show a significant positive 
relationship between average manager tenure and corporate bond performance generally, 
regardless of whether performance is measured by raw monthly returns or Fama and French’s 
(1993) five-factor alpha. However, in the crisis periods, this paper documents a significant 
negative relationship between average manager tenure and fund performance.  
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1. Introduction 
While there is a large amount of literature on the performance of mutual funds, the 
amount of literature based solely on corporate bond mutual funds is limited. With the current 
market environment and demographics of the population, this may be a mistake. According to 
ICI Factbook, bond mutual funds in 2017 experienced their largest net inflow of the past 5 years. 
These bond mutual fund inflows can be seen in Figure 1, which shows increasing net new cash 
flows in bond mutual funds over the last 3 years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
It shows a $260 billion inflow in 2017 compared to a $107 billion inflow in 2016. Of this 
$260 billion, $202 billion went into corporate bond mutual funds. Additionally, although U.S. 
equity mutual funds account for $10.3 trillion of the $18.7 trillion in total mutual fund assets, 
these funds had a $236 billion net outflow in 2017. Figure 1 also shows that the total assets of 
corporate bond mutual funds have been growing over the past three years. These numbers make 
studies on bond mutual funds more important now than they have been in the past due to the 
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recent growth. The last number to note is that active management accounted for 65% of U.S. 
mutual funds outstanding in 2017. This shows that while many believe that there is no value in 
active management, investors still have a high percentage of their assets in active funds. For this 
reason, active management in both the equity market and bond markets should be studied, even 
if it may not actually be beneficial to the investor. 
Many studies have been done on different aspects of active management in the mutual 
fund industry regarding how different variables affect performance. For example, one study 
(Bliss et al., 2008 ) found that mutual funds managed by teams had no difference in performance 
than mutual funds managed by individuals. Other studies have been conducted based on the 
merit of the manager. For example, Chevalier and Edison (1999) found that managers that went 
to high-SAT undergraduate schools experienced better risk-adjusted returns than their peers, and 
Yuhong and Mazumder (2017) found that managers with either a CFA or MBA performed better 
than managers without either. These studies were both performed on active mutual funds, 
regardless of classification. This paper’s aim will be to examine only corporate bond mutual 
funds and whether the average tenure of the manager, or managers, running a mutual fund affects 
the performance of that fund. This is important because as detailed above, investors still have an 
interest in active mutual funds, and they should have all the information possible regarding what 
factors can influence a mutual fund’s return. This study will focus on corporate bond mutual 
funds for two reasons. The first reason, mentioned above, is due to the increasing inflows 
corporate bond mutual funds have received over the past three years, and also as a result of the 
possible growth in the bond market in the near future. This growth may stem from the fact that 
baby boomers are reaching retirement age and will likely be moving more of their retirement into 
bond mutual funds. Another driver of possible increased assets in bond mutual funds is the fact 
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that interest rates may continue to be raised over the next few years with the economy showing 
strong growth and analysts predicting two rate hikes in 2019. As interest rates go up, more 
investors will look to active bond mutual funds to invest their money and get the best yield 
possible. These points make it interesting to analyze whether funds with longer average manager 
tenure have outperformed funds with shorter average manager tenure in the past, which may 
indicate that investors in the future may want to consider a bond mutual fund’s average manager 
tenure before deciding which fund to invest in. 
The results of this paper show a significant positive relationship between average 
manager tenure and performance in most cases. The only case where this differs is during the 
crisis period where longer tenured funds’ performance actually had a statistically significant 
negative relationship with average manager tenure. The pre and post-crisis periods, however, 
show a stronger positive relationship between tenure and performance than the full-time period. 
In general, the relationships between average manager tenure and performance is stronger in 
investment-grade funds. This may be due to a smaller number of funds in the high yield sample. 
Still, the relationship is statistically significant in most cases, specifically when looking at the 
regression for solely investment grade funds, compared to solely high yield funds, where the 
regression shows no statistically significant relationship.  
This paper has some contribution to past literature. It is one of the first papers to strictly 
look at manager tenure and performance using multiple techniques and looking at multiple time 
periods. It also documents convincing evidence that a fund’s average manager tenure has a 
positive relationship with performance in corporate bond mutual funds, and specifically 
investment grade corporate bond mutual funds.  
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The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 highlights past research on the topic 
of persistence in mutual funds, and on the topic of manager tenure and how it affects mutual fund 
performance. Section 3 outlines the formation of the hypothesis and what different results would 
imply about it. Section 4 outlines the data and key variables that will be used in the empirical 
analysis to test the hypothesis. Section 5 details the methods of analysis that will be used to study 
the relationship between tenure and performance. In Section 6, the main empirical results of the 
paper regarding manager tenure and expected corporate bond returns are presented. Section 7 is 
the conclusion of the paper.  
2. Literature Review 
 This section talks about the research that is relevant to the topic of manager tenure and 
corporate bond mutual funds. Section 2.1 talks about studies that have been done on the topic of 
persistence. It also talks about studies that research the difference in performance of active and 
passive on mutual fund performance. The characteristic in focus in this section is manager tenure 
funds. Section 2.2 discusses research related to manager characteristics and their effects. 
2.1 Active versus Passive Management  
The first research that should be acknowledged is in the area of persistence, which 
investigates whether specific mutual funds or managers are able to achieve positive performance 
over a long period of time. It is also important to note research on persistence specifically in 
bond mutual funds. Several papers agree that active management is not beneficial, and 
persistence does not exist. One paper (French, 2008), finds that active management costs 
investors 67 basis points a year relative to passive management, as an argument against 
persistence. French looked at the period from 1980 to 2006. Another paper (Cici & Gibson, 
2012), finds no evidence that bond fund managers are able to select bonds that outperform other 
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bonds with similar characteristics, concluding that there is not persistence, and investors should 
avoid active management. While acknowledging this research, it seems that academics are more 
likely to believe that there is persistence in bond mutual funds compared to equity mutual funds. 
Timmermann and Wermers (2006) find that, contrary to most studies, a sizable minority of 
managers are able to pick securities well enough to cover their costs and have positive alpha in 
all mutual funds. This study uses a bootstrap analysis to arrive at this conclusion. They find this 
necessary to make a proper conclusion because it helps combat the fact that individual funds 
exhibit normally distributed returns at times. This analysis evaluates the cross-sectional 
distribution of alphas in mutual funds, incorporating an analysis of a complicated mixture of 
fund alpha distributions in individual funds. Additionally, both Huang and Blanchfield (2009) 
and Moneta (2015) find that there is definitely evidence of short-term persistence in bond mutual 
funds, and Moneta even found that bond mutual funds from 1997-2006 were able to outperform 
their benchmarks before costs and fees by an average of 1%. Moneta was able to find this by 
studying U.S. bond mutual funds using a method that revolves around a novel data set of 
portfolio weights. This result is important to this paper because it shows that there may be some 
benefit to active management in bond mutual funds, which makes the topic of manager tenure 
and performance in active bond mutual funds more interesting. 
2.2 Relationship Between Tenure and Performance 
The literature regarding whether manager tenure has any effect on performance is split, 
and no studies have been done solely on corporate bond mutual funds. Golec (1996) shows 
evidence that manager tenure is the most significant predictor of performance, and that for each 
year tenure goes up, performance goes up by 5 basis points per year. He finds this using a three-
stage least squares regression in which he simultaneously studies a mutual fund’s risk and fees. 
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This study analyzes all mutual funds, including equity and bond mutual funds, during the period 
of 1988-1990. A similar study by Kaushik (2010) finds that tenure positively affects performance 
by 6 basis points per year. This study looks at a bigger dataset of monthly returns by also 
analyzing monthly returns from active mutual funds during the period 1999-2007. Quiang (2011) 
finds that tenure could both positively and negatively affect mutual funds returns. He found that 
during down markets with higher volatility longer-tenured managers have better performance, 
but that during boom markets with lower volatility this advantage becomes weaker and even 
negative in some markets. His study looked at mutual fund returns from 2000 to 2009. Another 
study found that tenure positively influences risk and fee-adjusted returns using panel regressions 
(Payne et. al., 1999). While these are adjusted returns, they certainly are a measure of a 
manager’s performance which makes the results of this paper support the hypothesis that longer-
tenured managers have higher performance. 
Some studies find that tenure has no effect on performance. Fortin et. al. (1999) finds no 
relationship, but he does find that as tenure goes up, a fund is expected to have lower turnover, 
lower expenses, and higher assets under management. In his analysis he splits up the funds into 
two baskets, one made up of funds with managers that have over 10 years of experience, and one 
made up of funds that have managers with less than 5 years of experience. He removes the 
sample in the middle to avoid confounding the data. Studies by Redman and Gullet (2006) and 
Yuhong and Long (2012) find that manager tenure has no effect on taxable or municipal bond 
mutual funds, or U.S. based international funds, respectively. Redman and Gullet look at 
monthly fund returns from 1997 to 2001. They then perform a regression analysis of the data 
controlling for things like fund size and expense ratios. Yuhond and Long also use a regression 
and control for many of the same factors but using monthly return data during the period 2005-
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2009. Kjetsaa and Kieff (2016) did a similar study on blend only mutual funds and find no 
significant relationship between tenure and performance. The main analysis on tenure in Kieff’s 
study is conducted looking at the difference in means of separate portfolios made up of managers 
with different lengths of tenure, while also controlling for expense ratios. 
Porter and Trifts performed two studies (2012 and 2014) on how experience affects 
mutual fund performance. The 2012 study uses a regression and focuses more on absolute 
performance, while the 2014 study uses multiple methods, all focused on relative performance 
against funds of the same style. Both studies have similar conclusions. The 2012 study finds that 
managers of ten years or greater perform above the market at a higher percentage than managers 
in their first three years. The 2014 study finds that managers of ten or more years have stronger 
monthly-adjusted performance when compared to managers of one, two, and three years. This 
2014 study also found that when comparing a manager of four, five, six, seven, eight, or nine 
years of tenure against managers with over ten years of tenure there is no difference in returns. 
This study also finds that in managers’ last year at a fund, they perform significantly worse than 
the managers that have over ten years of experience. Another study (Kempf et al., 2009) finds 
that a fund's relative performance against its peers had a much more significant effect on 
managers achieving longevity than anything else. This means that for managers to have 
longevity in their career, they had to not underperform their peers, rather than outperform their 
peers. Kempf concluded that this causes many managers to herd up into similar assets and adjust 
their risk to match other funds. For comparison to another industry, Brown et al. (2001) finds 
evidence of this same herding behavior in hedge funds and commodity trading advisors, 
concluding that managers were much more concerned with how other comparable managers 
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perform, rather than the performance of the market because they realized that they only have to 
keep up with these comparable managers’ performance in order to keep their jobs. 
3. Hypothesis 
 When forming the hypothesis for this paper it is important to take into account all of the 
previous studies and data that have been found. For this reason, both absolute performance and 
relative performance against other managers will be assessed. Performance against other 
managers will be looked at because, as Porter and Trifts (2012 & 2014), Kempf (2009), and 
Brown et al. (2001) found, managers like to gauge themselves against other managers. The null 
hypothesis in this paper, H0, is that there is not a positive relationship between managerial tenure 
and fund returns. Previous papers have found this to be true in all mutual funds which makes it a 
good starting point. Other papers have also found that tenure does have a relationship with 
performance in mutual funds, in addition to this, common sense says that if there was any 
relationship to be expected, it would be a positive relationship between manager tenure and 
returns. This is because as tenure increases it is assumed that experience increases which may 
give longer-tenured managers a better chance of outperforming. This positive relationship will be 
considered H1. An interesting result to also consider is that there is a negative relationship 
between manager tenure and performance. After analyzing H0 we will be able to see if this is a 
possibility. This would be a surprising relationship, but could maybe have some explanations. 
The alternative hypothesis is show below. 
H1: There is a positive relationship between managerial tenure and corporate bond mutual 
fund returns. 
 A rejection of H0 would imply that manager tenure does have a positive relationship with 
corporate bond mutual fund performance. This could imply that the bond market is too efficient 
9 
 
for a manager, regardless of his experience, to outperform other managers. This could also imply 
that managers are able to keep their jobs for reasons other than outperformance. A rejection of 
the null hypothesis may support H1, which implies that as managerial tenure goes up, a 
manager’s expected performance also goes up. This means that a manager with 4 years of 
experience is more likely to have a higher return than a manager with 1 year of experience. A 
rejection of H0  could also have the surprising result of implying the opposite, that as managerial 
tenure increases expected return decreases. One explanation for this could be that as a manager’s 
tenure increases, their job security increases as well, which may cause them to work less. 
Another explanation could be that as a manager’s tenure increases, their confidence increases 
causing them to possibly become overconfident leading to a decline in performance.  
4. Data 
 This section outlines a description of the data and variables used in the paper. Section 4.1 
outlines the sample of funds that are studied. Section 4.2 discusses some of the statistics of the 
sample when it is broken down into different pieces. Section 4.3 lays out some of the variables 
that will be important to better understand the results of the empirical analysis in section 5. 
4.1 Corporate Bond Sample 
The dataset used in this analysis was provided by Morningstar. It contains corporate bond 
mutual funds, excluding all other mutual funds such as equity, blend or government mutual 
funds. For each fund, monthly net returns from the period of 2002-2017 are used. To avoid 
survivorship bias, this includes funds that opened or closed inside of those dates. To avoid 
having a fund that has an overly high or low average monthly return due to a small sample size, 
and to allow the calculation of a funds alpha, funds with less than 12 months of monthly returns 
have been taking out of the sample. This period is a good period to look at because it contains a 
10 
 
recession in 2008 and 2009, making the sample more dynamic. To control for the variety of fund 
configurations that could refer to the same fund, only the oldest share class for each fund was 
used. Also, all funds that did not have a manager name and an average tenure were excluded. 
The sample does contain funds that are team managed. For this reason, the main independent 
variable being looked at is average manager tenure. It seemed appropriate not to exclude team 
managed funds because over 70% of corporate bond mutual funds are run by multiple managers, 
which makes this group of funds important to include. The sample contains six Morningstar 
categories for taxable bonds, but in this analysis, the funds are separated into two categories, 
High-Yield and Investment Grade. In total there are 665 funds the sample.  
4.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 1, Panel A:       
      
Fund Type: High Yield: Inv. Grade: Total: 
Number of Funds: 179 486 665 
Average Monthly Return: 0.53% 0.25% 0.33% 
Average Assets: 229,622 471,996 406,203 
Average Assets (2017): 248,426 669,653 552,870 
Average Turnover: 93.76% 168.11% 148.04% 
Average Expense Ratio: 1.72% 3.09% 2.70% 
    
Table 1, Panel B:       
      
Fund Type: Less than 4 4 to 8 8 and Over 
Number of Funds: 185 262 218 
Average Monthly Return: 0.29% 0.33% 0.36% 
Average Assets: 434,064 402,243 395,868 
Average Assets (2017): 498,991 553,822 612,260 
Average Turnover: 125.37% 165.75% 145.55% 
Average Expense Ratio: 2.27% 4.23% 118.00% 
Summary statistics of the sample can be seen in Table 1. Panel A shows the statistics on 
the sample sorted into high yield funds and investment grade funds. It shows there are over twice 
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as many investment-grade funds as high-yield funds. The statistics for average assets are broken 
down into two types. The first type, Average Assets, is an average of the monthly time series 
data of assets for each fund over the period from 2002-2017. The second type, Average Assets 
(2017), is the average assets in 2017 for the funds that were still in operation that year. These 
rows in Panel A show that investment grade funds are, on average, more than double the size of 
high yield funds. The panel also shows that investment grade funds have higher turnover and 
higher expenses, on average, than high yield funds. Lastly, the table shows that high yield funds 
have a higher average monthly return than investment grade funds, which makes sense because 
high-yield bonds are inherently riskier. Panel B shows the same descriptive statistics as Panel A, 
but the sample is broken down by a fund’s average manager tenure. The first group consists of 
funds with an average manager tenure of fewer than four years. The second group consists of 
funds with average manager tenure of four to eight years, not including eight. The third group 
consists of funds with an average manager tenure of eight years and over. One interesting 
statistic that the panel shows is that the average 2017 assets for funds go up as average manager 
tenure goes up. Another interesting point that this table shows is that the average expense ratio 
and average turnover is highest for the middle group of managers. The last intriguing observation 
is that the average monthly return goes up as the groups increase in managerial tenure. This is the 
positive relationship between managerial tenure and performance that one might expect, but of 
course, this result alone does not prove that there is a significant positive relationship. The 
standard deviation of the monthly returns for the entire sample is .22%. Using this number to 
calculate the standard error of the sample, and then calculating a t-statistic of the 8 and over 
group versus the two other groups, it is found that the difference between these returns is 
statistically significant at the 1% level. This may support the inference that managers with longer 
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tenure perform better, but it does not control for any variables and is only a cross-sectional 
analysis which means that it may not have any significance. Figure 2 shows a histogram of the  
average manager tenure of these 665 funds. It shows that the distribution for average manager 
tenure is skew right with the most observations lying from 2.8 to 4.6 years of average manager 
tenure. 
5. Methodology 
 This section will clearly outline the two methods of analysis that will be used to 
determine whether manager tenure has a relationship with corporate bond mutual fund 
performance. Section 5.1 explains some the performance measures and variables that are used. 
Section 5.2 explains how the univariate portfolio analysis is conducted. Section 5.3 explains how 
the panel regressions are performed. 
5.1 Variable Definitions 
 The methodologies used in this analysis will be based on net monthly returns of the 
mutual funds in the sample. Using monthly returns will provide a much larger sample than using 
Figure 2 
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yearly returns, allowing the analyses to be stronger. Also, the net returns are looked at because 
this analysis is not concerned with the expenses that a particular mutual fund chooses to have, 
and by using net returns as opposed to gross returns, this factor is stripped out. In the univariate 
analysis, these monthly returns form the “Raw Return,” which is the net monthly return with no 
adjustments. In addition to this return, an alternative to evaluating corporate bond returns is also 
used. This is Fama and French’s (1992) five-factor model: 
𝑅𝑖 ,𝑡− 𝑅𝑓 ,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +  𝛽𝑖,𝑀𝐾𝑇 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛽𝑖,𝑆𝑀𝐵 𝑆𝑀𝐵 + 𝛽𝑖,𝐻𝑀𝐿 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 +   𝛽𝑖,𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 𝑇𝐸𝑅𝑀
+ 𝐵𝑖,𝐷𝐸𝐹 𝐷𝐸𝐹𝑡 + 𝐸𝑖,𝑡, 
where MKT, SMB, and HML are the Fama-French three factors, Term is the term spread factor 
that shows the interest rate risk of bonds, and DEF is a default spread factor that shows the 
default risk premium. This five-factor alpha will be the dependent variable in both the univariate 
and regression analyses in this paper. The other dependent variable that will be seen in the 
regression analyses is “Excess Return.” This is the monthly return minus the risk-free rate. The 
other variables in the regression results are as follows.  
5.2 Portfolio Analysis 
In the portfolio analysis, the sample of funds is split into 3 groups (portfolios) each month 
based on average manager tenure. Although tenure is a snapshot variable, funds can be in 
different groups at different times due to the sample size in each month changing. The portfolios 
are rebalanced to equal weight each month. This is then used to find the raw monthly returns, as 
well as the Fama-French (1993) five-factor alphas of each portfolio. The difference between 
portfolio 3, comprised of the highest tenured funds, and portfolio 1, comprised of the shortest 
tenured funds is then looked at. The t-statistics for the three portfolios, and also the difference 
between portfolio 3 and portfolio 1 (3-1), are all looked at to check for significance. This 
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analysis is similar to Fortin’s (1999) analysis, which also created “portfolios” in a similar way 
and looked at the difference between the top and bottom group. Fortin also noted that it was 
important to take out the middle portfolio, portfolio 2, because of how it may confound the data.  
In addition to this 3-portfolio analysis, a portfolio analysis that splits the sample into two 
groups is also looked at. These results may be useful because each portfolio is made up of more 
funds, and they also will allow for another look into the data. This method may also shine a light 
on whether or not removing a middle section of funds has an effect on the results. Both the 3-
portfolio and 2-portfolio analyses, and all the following univariate analyses, will also contain 
results for when the sample is split up into investment grade and high yield funds. 
The sample will also be looked at when split up into time periods. This study will look at 
three different time periods, the first is the time period from July 2007 until February 2009. This 
time period was chosen to include the months of the recession caused by the financial crisis of 
2007-2009. This was a time of heightened volatility and could show interesting results regarding 
manager tenure’s affect, specifically when the markets are experiencing a multitude of ups and 
downs. The next time period is the “pre-crisis” period from January 2002 until June 2007. This 
time period includes data from a strong market and economy leading up to the crisis. The last 
time period is the “post-crisis” period from March 2009 until December 2017. This is similar to 
the pre-crisis time period due to them both having relatively low volatility. Each of these time 
periods also breaks down the sample into investment grade bond funds and high yield bond 
funds. This is important because investment grade funds and high yield funds have different 
characteristics, expected returns, and possibly attract different types of managers and investors, 
making the similarities and differences between the results of the two groups along with the 
results from the full sample of funds interesting. 
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5.3 Panel Regressions 
 This analysis is similar to the way Bu (2011) looks at the effect of mutual fund tenure in 
the total mutual fund market. It includes panel regressions which look at the effect of average 
manager tenure, log of total net monthly assets, new monthly flows, yearly turnover, and expense 
ratios on both excess returns (return – risk-free rate) and Fama-French’s (1993) five-factor 
adjusted alphas. This analysis will add some robustness to the study by not having it rely only on 
the univariate analysis. Log of total net monthly assets, net monthly flows, yearly turnover, and 
yearly expense ratio are all lagged by one period. Controlling for these variables will help 
prevent confounding the study, because other variables may affect both the dependent variable of 
monthly return and the other independent variables. This analysis will make it easy to see 
whether the panel regression finds average manager tenure to have a positive relationship with 
net monthly performance and five-factor alpha. It will also be easy to see how well the 
regression fits the data and how much inference can be put into the results if any at all. While not 
directly related, this method will also allow for some analysis of the control variables and their 
effects on both excess-adjusted return and five-factor adjusted alpha. The regression formula is 
shown below. 
𝑅 =  𝛼𝑖 + 𝐵𝑖,𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑇𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑟𝑒 +  𝐵𝑖,𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠) 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠)  + 𝐵𝑖,𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑙𝑦 𝐹𝑙𝑜𝑤
+  𝐵𝑖,𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 +  𝐵𝑖,𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 𝐸𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 
 These panel regressions will also be loosed at in different time periods and with high 
yield funds only and investment grade funds only. This is important because of the different 
characteristics of the two types of funds and the securities in those fund types. The different time 
period analyses in both the univariate analysis and the regression analysis will also allow a 
comparison to Quiang’s (2011) study which found that the positive relationship between 
manager tenure is stronger and more significant in periods of higher volatility.  
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6. Empirical Results 
This section presents the findings from both the univariate portfolio analysis and the 
panel regressions analyses. Subsection 1 includes the univariate results with its subsections each 
representing a specific time period. Subsection 1 then wraps up with a more consolidated 
conclusion from the univariate analysis. Subsection 2 includes the panel regressions results, with 
the subsections each representing a specific time period. This section also wraps up with a 
consolidated conclusion from the portfolio analysis. 
 6.1 Univariate Analysis 
 This subsection talks about the univariate portfolio analyses. The methodology for these 
analyses are described in section 5.2. The subsections break down the results based upon time 
periods in order to make the results more easily located. These results are shown in Table 2, 
Table 3 and Table 4, which show the univariate analysis results when looking at three groups, 
and Table 5, which shows the results from the portfolio analysis when looking at two groups. 
6.1.1 Full-Time Period 2002-2017 
Table 2 shows the results from the main portfolio analysis. Columns 1 – 3 show the 
results for each portfolio with the difference being shown in the column titled “3-1”. The table 
shows the raw return and five-factor alpha for each column 1-3 with the last column showing the 
difference. The t-statistics for these numbers are shown below. Based on raw results, portfolio 3 
generates returns of 37 basis points per month, while portfolio 1 generates returns of 36 basis 
points per month. It is also interesting that portfolio 2 has the highest returns at 39 basis points 
per month. When looking at the difference between portfolio 3 and portfolio 1, although it is 
small, the t-statistic of 2.38 signals that this difference is statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 2: 
1 2 3 3 - 1 
Raw Return: 0.36 0.39 0.37 0.02** 
 (5.52) (5.21) (5.46) (2.38) 
Five Factor Alpha: 0.11 0.13 0.13 0.01* 
  (2.11) (2.13) (2.25) (1.96) 
 
 
 
 Table 3: Group 1: Investment Grade Funds Group 2: High Yield Funds: 
  1 2 3 3 - 1 1 2 3 3 - 1 
Raw Return: 0.28 0.30 0.29 0.01 0.60 0.58 0.62 0.01 
 (5.13) (5.13) (5.16) (1.19) (4.31) (4.20) (4.40) (1.20) 
Five Factor Alpha: 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.00 0.30 0.28 0.30 0.01 
  (1.34) (1.35) (1.41) (0.44) (2.75) (2.59) (2.81) (0.47) 
Table 4: 
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Looking at the five-factor alpha, it shows that portfolio 3 also has a higher number than portfolio 
1, with the t-statistic of the difference resulting in a value of 1.96, which signals a statistically 
significant difference at the 10% level. Table 3 shows the results of the univariate analysis when 
the sample is split into high yield and investment grade. The results are split into Group 1 and 
Group 2 and each group has the results from Table 2. These groups show that in both investment 
grade and high yield funds individually there is not statistically significant differences between  
raw returns or five-factor alpha. Table 5 Panel A Group 1 shows the results from the two-group 
analysis. It reports similar, but weaker, results showing the difference between portfolio 2 and 
portfolio 1 to be statically significant for both performance metrics at the 10% level. 
Table 5: 
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6.1.2 Crisis Time Period July 2007 – February 2009 
Table 4 Panel A shows the results from the portfolio analysis during recession time. It 
contains three groups, each with the same format as Table 2. The results contrast Quiang’s 
(2011) research. Table 4 shows that, while the five-factor alpha difference is not statistically 
significant in any of the groups, the raw return difference is statistically significant in each 
group. For Group 1 containing all funds, the table shows that the highest tenured portfolio 
actually performs 7 basis points worse than the lowest tenured portfolio. The t-statistic for this 
difference is -2.07, which is significant at the 10% level. Group 2, containing investment grade 
funds, displayed a raw return difference of -8 basis points. This difference is significant at the 
1% level. What is interesting is that when only looking at high yield funds, Group 3, longer-
tenured funds still perform better than shorter tenured funds by 5 basis points, with the difference 
being significant at the 5% level. Table 5 Panel B shows the results when only using two groups, 
the results show the same negative relationship in Groups 1 and 2, and a positive relationship in 
Group 3.  
6.1.3 Pre-Crisis January and Post-Crisis Periods 
Table 4 Panel A and Panel B show the results from the portfolio analyses with 3 groups 
in the pre-crisis and post-crisis periods respectively. The results from these panels are similar to 
each other and to the results from the full-time period analysis. Group 1 of both Panel B and 
Panel C show a 3-basis point difference in monthly raw returns between the longest-tenured 
funds and shortest tenured funds. These differences are significant at the 1% level. The raw 
return difference in the investment grade group is 2 basis points and it is also significant at the 
5% level. Table 7 Panel C and Panel D show the univariate portfolio analysis during the pre and 
post-crisis time periods, and the results support the univariate analysis using 3 groups. 
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When looking at all the results, they show that average manager tenure is significantly 
positively associated with raw returns. This is shown by a positive different in the majority of the 
“3-1” columns of the tables. Many of these differences are also statistically significant. This 
being said, in relatively shorter periods of high volatility this positive relationship may not hold 
true and even become negative, specifically in investment grade funds. This relationship is seen 
in Table 4 panel A. 
6.2 Panel Regressions 
This subsection talks about the univariate portfolio analyses. The methodology for these 
analyses is described in section 5.3. The subsections break down the results based upon time 
periods in order to make the results more easily located. The results of these regression analyses 
are shown in Table 6, Table 7, Table 8, and Table 9. 
 Table 6: Panel A: All Funds Panel B: Investment Grade Panel C: High Yield 
  
Risk - 
Adjusted: 
Factor 
Adjusted: 
Raw 
Returns: 
Factor 
Adjusted: 
Raw 
Returns: 
Factor 
Adjusted: 
Intercept: 
-
1.712*** -2.329*** -0.528*** -1.052*** -0.255 -1.14*** 
  (-25.86)  (-35.22)  (-10.14)  (-20.24)  (-2.91)  (-13.00) 
Tenure: 0.036*** 0.036*** 0.023*** 0.023*** 0.006 0.006 
 (5.52) (5.48) (4.67) (4.61) (0.63) (0.61) 
Log Assets: 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.003** 0.004*** 0.001 0.001 
 (6.70) (7.06) (2.10) (3.26) (0.46) (0.15) 
Monthly Flow: 1.61*** 1.61*** 0.598*** 0.594*** 0.598*** 0.6*** 
 (43.36) (43.30) (19.86) (19.76) (12.82) (12.88) 
Turnover: 0.015*** -0.015*** 0.006*** 0.006*** -0.008** 0.008*** 
  (-7.41)  (-7.48) (4.17) (4.09)  (-2.02)  (-2.11) 
Expense Ratio: 4.21*** 2.233*** -1.82*** -1.867*** 3.355*** -3.282*** 
 (7.02) (7.01)  (-3.76)  (-3.87)  (-4.06)  (-3.98) 
R-Squared: 0.491 0.289 0.596 0.372 0.885 0.73 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.489 0.289 0.595 0.369 0.884 0.727 
Observations: 62,166 62,166 44,925 44,925 17,241 17,421 
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 Table 7: Panel A: All Funds Panel B: Investment Grade Panel C: High Yield 
  
Risk - 
Adjusted: 
Factor 
Adjusted: 
Raw 
Returns: 
Factor 
Adjusted: 
Raw 
Returns: 
Factor 
Adjusted: 
Intercept: -0.138 -2.04*** 0.972*** -0.885*** 2.569*** 0.779** 
  (-0.57)  (-8.47) (4.52)  (-4.13) (8.33) (2.54) 
Tenure: -0.06** -0.06** -0.039 -0.042 -0.02 -0.014 
  (-2.00)  (-2.00)  (-1.47)  (-1.62)  (-0.53)  (-0.38) 
Log Assets: -0.016** -0.007*** -0.01* -0.002 -0.025** -0.025** 
  (-2.27)  (-1.00)  (-1.70)  (-0.34)  (-2.53)  (-2.52) 
Monthly Flow: 3.19*** 3.188*** 1.62*** 1.612*** 1.376*** 1.41*** 
 (20.96) (21.02) (11.23) (11.21) (8.21) (8.46) 
Turnover: 0.03*** 0.03*** 0.015 0.016* -0.005 -0.008 
 (2.78) (2.82) (1.55) (1.68)  (-0.38)  (-0.55) 
Expense Ratio: -14.9*** -15.194*** 6.818*** -7.661*** -5.478 -6.65* 
  (-5.21)  (-5.32)  (-2.62)  (-2.96)  (-1.52)  (-1.85) 
R-Squared: 0.491 0.244 0.523 0.319 0.905 0.606 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.489 0.241 0.521 0.315 0.904 0.6 
Observations: 6,082 6,082 4,471 4,471 1,611 1,611 
 
6.2.1 Full-Time Period 2002-2017 
Table 6 shows the results from the panel regressions over the time period from 2002-
2017. The results of Panel 1, which includes the full sample of funds, demonstrate manager 
 Table 8: Panel A: All Funds Panel B: Investment Grade Panel C: High Yield 
  
Risk - 
Adjusted: 
Factor 
Adjusted: 
Raw 
Returns: 
Factor 
Adjusted: 
Raw 
Returns: 
Factor 
Adjusted: 
Intercept: -2.393*** -1.708*** -1.221*** -0.479*** -0.287 -0.049 
  (-20.82)  (-15.01)  (-15.41)  (-6.12)  (-1.48)  (-0.25) 
Tenure: 0.037*** 0.038*** 0.015* 0.014* 0.029 0.025 
 (3.04) (3.14) (1.79) (1.71) (1.56) (1.34) 
Log Assets: 0.028*** 0.024*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.022*** 0.019*** 
 (9.19) (8.07) (2.86) (3.42) (3.89) (3.42) 
Monthly Flow: 1.46*** 1.435*** 0.463*** -0.452*** 0.475*** 0.478*** 
 (18.89) (18.77) (8.63) (8.52) (3.93) (3.99) 
Turnover: -0.028*** -0.028*** -0.004* -0.004 0.006 0.005 
  (-7.09)  (-7.15)  (-1.69)  (-1.47) (0.74) (0.66) 
Expense Ratio: 9.09*** 8.15*** -3.059*** -3.292*** 2.959 2.956 
 (3.92) (7.03)  (-3.63)  (-3.96) (1.58) (1.60) 
R-Squared: 0.481 0.185 0.716 0.23 0.845 0.691 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.478 0.181 0.714 0.225 0.842 0.685 
Observations: 13,209 13,209 9,742 9,742 3,467 3,467 
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tenure does have a significant positive relationship with both risk-adjusted monthly return and 
five-factor alpha. It shows that as average manager tenure goes up one year, the expected risk-
adjusted monthly return goes up by 3.6 basis points, and this result is significant at the 1% level. 
The five-factor alpha also goes up by 3.6 basis points and this is significant at the 1% level as 
well. The investment grade section in Panel B shows similar results, with both raw returns and 
five-factor alpha increasing by 2.3 basis points for each year of manager tenure. Both results are 
significant at the 1% level. The adjusted R-squared shows that this regression fits the data well,  
specifically for risk-adjusted returns, at .489 in Panel A, and .595 in Panel B. The high yield 
section shows no significant relationship. An interesting trend that is revealed on this table as 
well as in the later tables is that log assets, monthly flow, turnover, and expense ratios have 
statistically significant effects on both risk-adjusted monthly return and five-factor adjusted 
alpha. The results in this table show a positive relationship between log assets, monthly flow, and 
expense ratio and risk-adjusted returns, and a negative relationship between turnover and risk-
adjusted returns. The positive relationship between expenses and performance is interesting. 
6.2.2 Crisis Time Period July 2007 – February 2009 
 The results from Table 9 Panel A show that average manager tenure may not have a 
statistically significant positive relationship with performance. This panel shows a 6-basis point 
decrease in performance and five-factor alpha for each year of tenure, and these results are 
significant at the 5% level. In the investment grade and high yield sections, the results also show 
a negative relationship, although there is no significance. These results imply that when volatility 
is higher, and there is a lot of new information entering the market, more experienced managers 
do not have an advantage, and even that they possibly have a negative advantage. One 
explanation for this may be that since these managers have more experience, they believe more 
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strongly in their opinions and are stubborn in their management, possibly causing their returns to 
suffer. This contrasts to a less experienced manager who may be more conservative during times 
of high volatility due to them acknowledging that they may not have little experience. Panel A 
also shows a relatively high Adjusted R-squared at .489 for risk-adjusted returns. The number of 
observations, however, is much smaller than the full sample due to this time period including 
less than two years of monthly returns. The other thing to note from the table that is different 
from the full-time period is that log assets, turnover, and expense ratio all have a negative 
relationship with performance in this time period. 
6.2.3 Pre-Crisis January and Post-Crisis Periods 
 The pre and post-crisis results are similar to each other and also similar to the full-time 
period sample. Each of the variables in Panel A of both Table 8, showing pre-crisis results, and 
Table 9:  Panel A: All Funds Panel B: Investment Grade Panel C: High Yield 
  
Risk - 
Adjusted: 
Factor 
Adjusted: 
Raw 
Returns: 
Factor 
Adjusted: 
Raw 
Returns: 
Factor 
Adjusted: 
Intercept: -1.501*** -2.226*** -0.462*** -1.032*** -0.084 -1.147*** 
  (-21.26)  (-31.59)  (-8.54)  (-19.14)  (-0.91)  (-12.32) 
Tenure: 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.036*** 0.034*** -0.001 -0.001 
 (3.69) (6.44) (6.41) (6.18)  (-0.10)  (-0.13) 
Log Assets: 0.012*** 0.014*** 0.005*** 0.007*** 0 -0.003 
 (6.58) (7.87) (4.03) (5.48)  (-0.05)  (-1.16) 
Monthly Flow: 1.33*** 1.324*** 0.438*** 0.438*** 0.481*** -0.479*** 
 (31.43) (31.36) (13.11) (13.14) (9.16) (9.14) 
Turnover: -0.016*** -0.016*** 0.008*** 0.007*** 0.013*** -0.013*** 
  (-7.42)  (-7.50) (5.17) (5.00)  (-2.80)  (-2.79) 
Expense Ratio: 6.06*** 5.76*** -0.337 -4.98 4.329*** -4.333*** 
 (8.87) (8.44)  (-0.63)  (-0.93)  (-4.62)  (-4.63) 
R-Squared: 0.48 0.25 0.571 0.322 0.881 0.681 
Adj. R-Squared: 0.478 0.248 0.57 0.32 0.879 0.678 
Observations: 42,875 75,875 30,712 30,712 12,163 12,163 
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Table 9, showing the post-crisis results are significant. One specific difference is that these two 
tables show a stronger relationship between average manager tenure and performance than the 
full-time period. Table 8 shows that as manager tenure goes up by one year, risk-adjusted 
performance goes up by 3.7 basis points compared to 3.6 basis points in the full-time period. 
Table 9 shows an even stronger relationship during the post-crisis time period with risk-adjusted 
performance increasing 5.1 basis points for each year of manager tenure. Both of these results 
are statistically significant at the 1% level. Panel B of both these tables also shows that the 
investment grade funds have a statistically significant positive relationship between average 
manager tenure and performance. The results in Panel C, looking at high yield funds, show no 
relationship between tenure and performance. 
 The results of the panel regression echo and support the results of the univariate analysis 
when it comes to average manager tenure. While there is a negative relationship between 
performance and tenure during the crisis period, in the full-time period and the pre and post-
crisis periods, there is a statically significant positive relationship between average manager 
tenure and performance, when measured by both returns and five-factor alpha, in the full sample 
of funds. This relationship is also found clearly in investment grade funds. In high yield funds, 
however, there is not a clear relationship between average manager tenure and high yield funds. 
The univariate analysis shows a significant positive relationship in both the full-time period and 
crisis period, but no relationship in any of the regression analyses. This is with a very high 
adjusted r-squared in the regressions at over .8 in all cases. Although not directly related, the 
results from the regressions showing that log assets and expense ratio have a positive relationship 
with performance in the full-time period is interesting. This is contrary to what may be seen in 
equity mutual funds and past research, which generally find that as fund size goes up, it is harder 
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to increase return, and that as expenses go up, returns decrease. What this also implies, is that 
tenure is positively related to fund assets, monthly flow, and expense ratio, and negatively 
related to turnover. These results along with the results from the univariate analysis lead to a 
rejection of the null hypothesis which states that there is not a positive relationship, and an 
acceptance of H1 which says that there is a positive relationship. 
7. Conclusion 
 Golic (1996) finds that manager tenure is the most significant predictor of performance 
and that as manager tenure goes up by 1 year, performance goes up by 5 basis points per year. 
Other studies (Kaushik, 2010 and Quiang, 2011) find similar results in equity mutual funds. 
Fortin (1999) however, finds relationships using a very similar analysis as this paper’s univariate 
portfolio analysis. Porter and Trifts (2012 and 2014) also study the topic extensively in equity 
mutual funds and find mixed results. The results of this paper align with the first group of papers 
that find a positive relationship. This is also the first paper to look at the relationship between 
manager tenure and performance specifically in corporate bond mutual funds. The analyses in 
this paper also use a larger dataset when compared to many of these other studies. This means 
that the analysis is able to analyze the relationship between tenure and performance over a long 
period of time which is how long many investors will hold a mutual fund for. 
 Over the period of 2002-2017 this paper documents a positive relationship between 
average manager tenure and fund performance when measured both by monthly return and five-
factor alpha. The univariate analysis shows a statically significant 2 basis points difference 
between raw returns of funds with the top third of tenure versus funds with the bottom third of 
tenure. The results in specific time periods are similar, however negative in the shortened time 
period of the financial crisis. Still, an extra 2 basis point monthly return can add up over time, 
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and recessions do not last for a relatively long period of time. This relationship is seen stronger 
in investment grade funds. The regression analysis shows similar results. Over the full-time 
period, as average manager tenure goes up by 1 year, the expected risk-adjusted return goes up 
by 3.6 basis points. These results once again show a negative relationship during the crisis, but a 
stronger relationship in the pre and post-crisis time periods, these results are significant in all the 
time periods. This relationship sticks in investment grade funds, while it is not found to be 
statistically significant in high yield funds. 
 This study sheds light on the fact that if investors are looking to buy a bond mutual fund 
and hold it for a long period of time, they should consider average manager tenure. While the 
difference may be small, over time the difference in performance that average manager tenure is 
associated with can add up over time, and potentially allow a person saving for retirement to be 
better off. 
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